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 Recent years have seen major concerns about the growth of both economic and 
political inequality in Euro-Atlantic countries. The claim that political inequality has 
increased is often expressed by saying that politics has become more ‘oligarchic’ or 
‘post-democratic’, with policy-making strongly influenced, more so than in the 
relatively recent past, by business corporations and the very wealthy.2 At the level of 
political activism, this is part of what is conveyed by the contrast between the ‘1%’ and 
the ‘99%’.3 The ‘1%’ is not just an economically privileged group, but a group that is 
held to have disproportionate political influence. This state of affairs has prompted 
interest in rethinking democratic political structures, such as interest in direct 
democracy and/or in the use of lottery-like mechanisms (‘sortition’) to select 
representatives. These proposals tend to focus on political institutions, however, while 
abstracting from the associational context in which these institutions work. Yet changes 
in the associational environment – in particular, the decline of trade unions – play a 
central role in influential accounts of how the oligarchic shift, as we might call it, has 
occurred. The discussion of how to address this shift thus seems somewhat disconnected 
from discussion of how it emerged.  
 In this chapter, we aim to reconnect the two by revisiting the issue of how trade 
unions potentially contribute to political equality. We argue that the state’s adoption of 
a promotive stance towards trade unionism and collective bargaining should be seen, in 
part, as a feature of a stable democratic polity, one that is more internally resilient to 
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to audiences in Braga, London, Manchester, Newcastle, Paris, and Seoul for 
valuable discussion both of this material and of some of its precursors. Special thanks for helpful and 
productive discussion to Gustaf Arrhenius, Juliana Bidadanure, Alan Bogg, Daniel Butt, Jurgen De 
Wispelaere, Eva Erman, Marc Fleurbaey, Joe Guinan, Angus Hebenton, James Hickson, Louis-Philippe 
Hodgson, Stephen Hood, Jiwei Ci, Elizabeth Kahn, Hyunseop Kim, Cécile Laborde, Hélène Landemore, 
Virginia Mantouvalou, Emily McTernan, Gabriel Monette, Mirjam Müller, John O’Neill, Shin Osawa, 
Tom Parr, Mathias Risse, Julie Rose, Christian Schemmel, Fabian Schuppert, Jiewuh Song, Nicholas 
Southwood, Lucas Stanczyk, Andrew Walton, and Laura Valentini. Martin O’Neill would like to record 
his gratitude to the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF) for their generous support in the 
shape of a Mid-Career Research Fellowship on “Democracy at Work: Power, Voice, and Employment in 
the 21st Century”. 
2 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Polity Press 2004). 
3Jo h E Sti lit ‘Of th 1% b th 1% f th 1%’ [2011] Va it Fai
2 Colin C ouch, Post-Democracy (Polit  Press 2004). 
3J seph E iglitz, ‘Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%’ [2011] Vanity Fair 
<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-perc nt-201105> accessed 19 December 2017; 
Joseph E Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (W W Norton & Company 2012). 
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oligarchical pressures. In this way, we argue that basic questions of labour law, which 
affect trade unions’ formation and operation, need to be viewed from the standpoint of 
democratic theory and in light of the challenge of preventing a drift of representative 
institutions towards oligarchy. 
 We proceed as follows. In section 1 we clarify the oligarchic shift thesis and 
briefly outline some of the proposals for addressing it by means of changes to the 
structures of democratic policy-making. We also draw out the aforementioned 
disconnection between the discussion of what has caused the shift and how we might 
address it. In section 2 we then set out some of the ways in which trade unions can be 
expected to contribute towards political equality and, in this way, help to reverse and 
prevent oligarchic shifts. We also respond to the objection that unions can be bad for 
democracy. On this basis we argue, in section 3, that the democratic state should adopt a 
promotive stance towards trade unions and collective bargaining. We clarify what the 
promotive stance involves and respond to some objections to it. Section 4 concludes 
with some remaining questions about the possible implications of our argument for 
democratic constitutionalism and democratic life within trade unions. 
 
1. The oligarchic shift and the rethinking of democracy 
In the spring of 2014 newspapers and websites in the US and around the world 
(including the UK) ran a story about a highly quantitative article in an academic 
political science journal. Headlines were typically of the form: ‘Study finds US is an 
oligarchy, not a democracy’.4 The reports concerned a paper by Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin I. Page.5 Gilens and Page examine how the likelihood of a policy’s adoption 
by the US government is affected by the level of support it receives from the average 
voter (the voter in the middle of the income distribution). They find that once we 
control for the preferences of the rich (the top 10% of the income distribution) and of 
organised interest groups, the level of support for a policy by the voter on median 
income makes no difference to the likelihood of its adoption. Policy is sensitive to the 
preferences of the better off and of organised interest groups; but apparently not to those 
of the economically average citizen. (Organised interest groups do not do much to offset 
                                                
4 See e.g. BBC, ‘Study: US Is an Oligarchy, Not a Democracy’ BBC News (17 April 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746> accessed 7 August 2017. 
5 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I Page, ‘Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens’ (2014) 12 Perspectives on Politics 564. 
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this as they are weighted towards business corporations and the better off.) If, however, 
policy-making is insensitive to the preferences of the economically average citizen, how 
can the US really be a democracy? 
Although these results have been challenged,6 Gilens and Page are not alone in 
suggesting that the US is, or has become, oligarchic in character. For Jacob Hacker and 
Paul Pierson, an important ‘smoking gun’ here is the marked difference in the 
distribution of gains from economic growth in the post-war period (1945-79) when 
compared to this distribution in more recent years.7 While in the first period income 
growth was roughly the same across the income distribution, meaning that everyone 
was sharing equally in growth, the period since 1979 has seen an extreme concentration 
of economic growth at the top-end of the income distribution. This cannot be plausibly 
explained by economic changes alone, but reflects policy choices and the political 
forces that have shaped these choices. According to Hacker and Pierson a key set of 
developments, helping to explain the observed change in the distribution of gains from 
growth, concerns the representation of social interests in the policy-making process. 
Business corporations have hugely increased their formal organisation and lobbying 
efforts since the 1970s. Trade unions have been in decline over the same period. Elected 
representatives face growing costs in running election campaigns and have therefore 
become more reliant on those who have the money to help them, tipping them into more 
reliance on richer voters and business corporations.  
Hacker and Pierson’s study is consistent with a wider argument presented in a 
series of works by Colin Crouch.8 Crouch argues that many advanced capitalist nations 
have become ‘post-democratic’ in the past thirty or so years. They retain important 
democratic features such as universal adult suffrage, open political competition and 
expansive rights of free speech. But the effective representation of social interests has 
narrowed, so that ‘politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the 
control of privileged elites in the manner of pre-democratic times...’.9 Globalisation has 
enhanced businesses’ bargaining power by increasing their exit options, Crouch argues, 
                                                
6 Omar S Bashir, ‘Testing Inferences about American Politics: A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result’ 
(2015) 2 Research & Politics 1 - Omar Bashir’s study nevertheless offers some evidence consistent with 
the oligarchy thesis. Looking at who wins when the preferences of the average citizen and the highest 
income 10% conflict, he finds that the rich win roughly 50% of the time (p7).  
7 Jacob S Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer-
and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon & Schuster 2010). 
8 Crouch (n 1); Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism (Polity Press 2011); Colin 
Crouch, Making Capitalism Fit for Society (Polity Press 2013). 
9 Crouch (n 1) 6. 
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while at the same time deindustrialisation has led to union decline and to a weakening 
of the relationship between unions and parties of the left and centre-left. These parties 
have tended to solicit more support from business and have had to become more 
responsive to them.  
Alongside these studies, there is no doubt that the last decade has seen the 
emergence of a form of activism that is centrally motivated by a perceived failure of 
democracy. In a recent study of what they call ‘subterranean politics’ in Europe, 
encompassing among other groups Occupy and the Indignados, Mary Kaldor and 
Sabine Selchow find that a common feature of this politics across the continent is 
‘extensive frustration with formal politics as it is currently practised…. current protests 
are not so much simply about austerity but about politics’.10 This frustration with 
‘politics’ is linked to ‘projects of collective re-imagining of democracy’.11 Concerns 
about the alleged oligarchic shift have promoted a rethinking of democracy at the 
academic level too. 
One expression of this is interest in more use of direct democracy. Proposals for 
greater use of direct democracy, e.g., referendums, feature in the programmes of 
European Pirate Parties and of the Partido X in Spain, a party that emerged out of the 
Indignados movement.12 Another expression, initially more a focus of the academic 
literature but with a growing presence in activist thinking, is for the use of random or 
near-random selection of representatives. For example, in his recent book on 
‘Machiavellian democracy’, John McCormick has proposed the creation, in the US 
context, of a Tribunate, a body of 51 citizens selected at random from the US population 
for a short term of office, but with politicians and the rich (those in the top 10% of the 
wealth distribution) excluded from eligibility.13 The Tribunate would have powers to 
veto decisions by other branches of the US government, to put one proposal a year to a 
national referendum, and to initiate impeachment proceedings against officials in other 
government branches. McCormick understands the Tribunate as having an explicitly 
anti-oligarchic function: as representing ‘the people’ as distinct from the economic elite 
and, thereby, as building a stronger sense of popular consciousness in relation to the 
                                                
10 Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow, ‘The “Bubbling Up” of Subterranean Politics in Europe’ (2013) 9 
Journal of Civil Society 78, 84. 
11 ibid 88. 
12 See the website of Partido X at https://partidox.org/democracia-y-punto-version-reducida/ and the 
website of the Icelandic Pirate Party at http://www.piratar.is/policies/?lang=en  
13 John P McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy (CUP 2011). 
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elite. Meanwhile Alex Guerrero has argued for the full replacement of elected 
representation with representative assemblies selected by lot, on the ground that this 
‘lottocratic’ system would be much less vulnerable to elite capture than elected 
representation.14 
Arguments for new political institutions and processes of this kind might or 
might not have their merits, but it is surely important to consider not only the nature of 
democratic institutions themselves but the associational environment within which they 
work. After all, if we return to the research cited above on the alleged emergence of the 
oligarchic shift, we do see an emphasis on the role of associational change. In particular, 
Hacker and Pierson and Crouch both identify the decline of trade unionism as one factor 
causing the shift.15 Indeed, inattention to associational factors may lead democratic 
reformers either to overstate the problems with established forms of representation or to 
overstate the gains from proposed innovations. Guerrero, for example, argues that 
electoral representation fails as a device for holding representatives to account because 
voters are too ignorant of their interests and of what their representatives do.16 But voter 
ignorance is not a fixed constant of electoral representative democracy. Hacker and 
Pierson argue that one way the decline of trade unions has contributed to the rise of a 
‘winner-takes-all’ politics and economy is precisely by weakening the informational 
basis on which ‘middle-class’ citizens approach politics.17 By the same token, it may be 
that a revival of broad-based associations within the US ‘middle-class’ would improve 
things and so mitigate voter ignorance.18 Those proposing a turn to solutions such as 
direct democracy might also consider how far this is likely to tackle oligarchy by itself. 
Who will have the resources to shape agendas for direct democracy and to intervene in 
debates prior to votes? Will advantage not lie with the rich and with business 
corporations? A strong civil society able to counteract the power of money is likely to 
                                                
14 Alexander A Guerrero, ‘Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative’ (2014) 42 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 135. 
15 Unionisation has declined in all OECD countries (with ‘peak’ years ranging from 1960 to 1995). See 
Jonas Pontusson, ‘Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution’ (2013) 51 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 797, 800, table 1. 
16 Guerrero (n 14) 140. 
17 Hacker and Pierson (n 7) 139–158. Hacker and Pierson’s talk of the ‘middle class’ can be confusing for 
their readers in the UK, where the term denotes those in professional and managerial occupations, in the 
upper parts of the income distribution. Hacker and Pierson’s US-English use of the term is much broader, 
including workers on relatively low or moderate incomes. 
18 Guerrero goes some way to acknowledge this point when he says that ‘there are some contexts in which 
these properties [e.g., voter ignorance] might not obtain’, in which ‘an electoral representative system 
might fare better’ Guerrero (n 14) 153–154. 
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be very important. Hacker and Pierson make this point about the importance of 
associations with the present US political system in mind, but the point applies more 
generally: 
‘Voters are hardly powerless. But their attention to what government actually 
does is limited and typically brief. And given the complexity of our political 
institutions, they can have a devilishly hard time determining whom they should hold 
accountable when they are discontented. In our fragmented political system, victories 
without enduring organization are almost always fleeting. To influence the exercise of 
government authority in a modern democracy generally requires a range of formidable 
capabilities: the capacity to mobilize resources, coordinate actions with others, develop 
extensive expertise, focus sustained attention, and operate flexibly across multiple 
domains of activity. These are the attributes of organizations, not discrete, atomized 
voters.’19  
With Hacker and Pierson’s general point in mind, we intend now to explore the 
contribution that trade unions in particular might make to reversing and/or preventing 
the oligarchic shift.20 
 
2. Trade unions and political equality 
There is considerable evidence that organised labour, including trade unionism, 
plays an important causal role in the replacement of authoritarian with democratic 
regimes.21 Within democratic politics itself, there are a number of ways in which trade 
unions can affect the relationships of informal power within which politics takes place. 
As well as representing their members within the workplace, trade unions can provide a 
                                                
19 Hacker and Pierson (n 7) 113. 
20 In their response to McCormick’s Tribunate proposal, David Owen and Graham Smith suggest that 
trade unions might perform the tribunate role. See Owen and Smith, ‘Machiavellian Democratic 
Innovations: McCormick’s People’s Tribunate’ (2011) 20 The Good Society 203. 
21 See e.g. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber and John D Stephens, Capitalist Development and 
Democracy (University of Chicago Press 1992); Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D 
Stephens, ‘The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy’ (1993) 7 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 71. According to Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, at p83: ‘The level of economic 
development is causally related to the development of political democracy. However, the underlying 
reason for the connection…is that capitalist development transforms the class structure, enlarging the 
working and middle classes and facilitating their self-organization, thus making it more difficult for the 
elites to exclude them politically’ (italics added).  The rise of trade unions is an important element of what 
the authors refer to here as the ‘self-organization’ of the working class. Other variables mediate the 
impact of working-class self-organisation, so that democratisation is not the only or inevitable outcome 
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much wider form of ‘countervailing power’ to the rich and business corporations.22 This 
role can be achieved by a number of discrete, but sometimes intertwined and 
interacting, mechanisms. We here describe several such mechanisms: (1) increasing 
political participation; (2) improving voter information; (3) cultivating democratic 
character; (4) contributing to cementing partisan alliances and building social trust 
within political parties; (5) widening elite recruitment; and (6) giving direct voice to 
workers’ interests thereby shaping the terms of political argument. We also briefly 
comment on (7) possible contributions to coordination of transnational political action 
and (8) unions’ potential role in shifting control over investment in a more democratic 
direction. Finally, we respond to a vein of scepticism about unions and democracy. 
 
2.1 Unions and political participation 
 ‘Why should we be beggars with the ballot in our hand?’ This line from an old 
Liberal song conveys a basic truth about the potentially empowering and equalising 
effects of universal suffrage.23 However, the ballot’s impact will not be felt if it is not 
exercised, particularly by those who have few other sources of influence. Thus, one way 
in which trade unions might contribute to the health of democracy is through their 
impact on participation in democratic institutions and processes, e.g., on voting in 
elections. Unions might encourage participation in a range of ways.24 They might foster 
a sense of efficacy in the workplace that carries over into other areas such as electoral 
politics (see also section 4.3 below). They might give individuals more information that 
prompts participation (see also section 4.2 below). They may give individuals a sense of 
collective belonging or identity that makes voting more of a benefit in expressive 
terms.25 They may change what politicians offer at elections so as to engage specific 
groups. Not least, they can help voters get to the polling station on the day of an election 
(and help them to register to vote where this is necessary). This effect on participation 
furthers political equality insofar as it works in particular to raise participation amongst 
                                                
22 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Houghton 
Mifflin Company 1952); Sidney Verba, Jae-on Kim and Norman H Nie, Participation and Political 
Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (CUP 1978); see also Wolfgang Streeck and Anke Hassel, ‘Trade 
Unions as Political Actors’ in John T Addison and Claus Schnabel (eds), International Handbook of 
Trade Unions (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2003). 
23 The song is ‘The Land’ and featured in the campaigns for land reform initiated by British Liberals in 
the early twentieth century. 
24 Patrick Flavin and Benjamin Radcliff, ‘Labor Union Membership and Voting across Nations’ (2011) 30 
Electoral Studies 633, 634–635. 
25 Carole J Uhlaner, ‘Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups’ (1989) 33 American Journal of 
Political Science 390. 
8	
	
disadvantaged individuals, working against the frequently observed class profile in 
political participation. 
That is the theory, but what is the evidence? There is a good deal of evidence 
that is consistent with these expectations. Aggregate-level studies have found a 
statistical association between union density and voting turnout across nations and 
across time.26 Declining voter turnout across the bulk of OECD nations is statistically 
associated with the decline in trade unionism: ‘Overall, those nations that saw a 
decrease in unionization also saw the greatest average decline in voter turnout’.27 
Individual-level studies have found that union members are more likely to vote than 
non-union members.28 There is dispute as to how far this association is causal, such that 
union membership independently causes higher participation. There is, however, some 
evidence to support the causal interpretation, at least as part of what is going on.29 There 
is also some evidence that union effects on political participation are stronger for those 
with lower educational levels.30 By contrast, one recent study by Aina Gallego finds that 
strong unions do not improve equality in voting across social classes.31 However 
Gallego speculates that this might reflect changes in the profile of workers represented 
in unions, away from the most disadvantaged groups: while unions might once have 
mobilised poorer voters so as to narrow class inequalities in voting, they do so to a 
lesser extent now because they have become less representative of poorer voters. The 
study thus underscores the importance of looking at which groups of people unions 
represent and mobilise, and how this might be changed.32 
                                                
26 Mark Gray and Miki Caul, ‘Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 
1997’ (2000) 33 Comparative Political Studies 1091; Benjamin Radcliff and Patricia Davis, ‘Labor 
Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial Democracies’ (2000) 44 American Journal of 
Political Science 132; Pontusson, ‘Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution’ (n 15) 808–810. 
27 Gray and Caul (n 26) 1103. 
28 Daryl D’Art and Thomas Turner, ‘Trade Unions and Political Participation in the European Union: Still 
Providing a Democratic Dividend?’ (2007) 45 British Journal of Industrial Relations 103; Flavin and 
Radcliff (n 24); Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer, ‘Union Membership and Political Participation in 
the United States’ (2013) 91 Social Forces 895. 
29 D’Art and Turner (n 28) 118; Kerrissey and Schofer (n 28) 917–918. 
30 Kerrissey and Schofer (n 28) 909. 
31 Aina Gallego, ‘Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative Perspective’ 
(2010) 29 Electoral Studies 239. 
32 In the UK, the class profile of trade unionism has changed substantially in the last fifty years. In the 
1960s, a majority of trade union members were ‘working-class’ (people in manual jobs with relatively 
low education). Today, around half of trade unionists in the UK are in the ‘new middle class’ (non-
manual workers with relatively high education levels), and unionisation is actually higher amongst those 
in the new middle class than in the working-class. See Geoffrey Evans and James Tilley, The New 
Politics of Class: The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class (OUP 2017) 65–67.The 
consequences of such changes are discussed in Pontusson, ‘Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution’ 
(n 15). Pontusson finds that while union decline helps explain growing inequality in earnings and reduced 
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 Janice Fine’s work on ‘community unions’ in the US focuses on the way new 
kinds of labour- and community-based associations have emerged in response to the 
limitations of coverage and responsiveness by the mainstream trade union movement.33 
Fine’s case studies indicate how, through community-based campaigns against specific 
employers or for specific policy measures, these associations can help particularly 
disadvantaged groups of workers, such as immigrant workers, become political 
participants: ‘Learning that they could take part in a public confrontation without 
feeling that they were placing their lives in jeopardy was an important lesson about 
civic participation in their new home’.34 
 
2.2 Unions and political information  
As we noted above, some critics find fault with electoral representative 
democracy because of voter ignorance. As we also noted, however, levels of voter 
ignorance need not be taken as a given, and we may respond to it not by rejecting 
elected representation but instead by seeking to change public awareness of political 
matters. One possible strategy is to promote an associational culture in which 
individuals are able to access such ‘political goods’ through secondary associations such 
as trade unions. Hacker and Pierson suggest that a lack of organisations in the US 
‘middle-class’ weakens the ability of its members to develop an informed sense of the 
nature and significance of economic inequality, and what might be done about it.35 
Torbern Iversen and David Soskice point out that, contrary to what one might initially 
expect, ‘polarization’ of voters between left and right is currently negatively correlated 
in ‘advanced democracies’ with levels of income inequality: high inequality is 
                                                                                                                                          
redistribution in OECD countries in the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, it is less able to 
explain these trends after the mid-1990s. He suggests this may reflect an upward shift in the average 
position of union members in the income distribution: as unionists have become relatively higher earners, 
on average, unions have come to exert less compression on wages inequality and less pressure for 
redistribution. 
33 Fine describes community unionism as follows: ‘They are modest-sized community-based 
organizations of low-wage workers that focus on issues of work and wages in their communities. These 
organizations are mediating institutions that are based in specific ethnic and geographic communities (as 
opposed to specific workplaces) that provide support to communities of low-wage workers, especially 
immigrants and African Americans’ - Janice Fine, ‘Community Unions and the Revival of the American 
Labor Movement’ (2005) 33 Politics & Society 153, 154. On the limitations of mainstream unions in 
responding to the needs of these groups of workers, the resulting tensions between them and community 
unions, and on how the two might work together more constructively, see also Janice Fine, ‘A Marriage 
Made in Heaven? Mismatches and Misunderstandings between Worker Centres and Unions’ (2007) 45 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 335.. 
34 Fine, ‘Community Unions and the Revival of the American Labor Movement’ (n 33) 165. 
35 Hacker and Pierson (n 7) 151–158. 
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associated with low voter polarisation (as in the US). Part of their explanation is that 
high inequality is associated with relatively weak trade unionism which, in turn, 
contributes to a low level of political information amongst voters which, in turn, leads 
people to adopt ‘centrist’ political positions.36 This is consistent with Hacker and 
Pierson’s argument that a lack of union presence leads to a lack of awareness of 
inequality and what might be done about it. 
 
2.3 Unions and democratic character 
   A third potential union contribution, connected to impacts on participation and 
information, relates to the effects of unions on what we might term democratic 
character: the willingness and capacity of individuals to engage in democratic politics 
and to do so in ways that are informed by judgements of the common good. There is a 
long tradition in political thought that links the structure of authority and decision-
making in the workplace to the general capacity for democratic citizenship, and we need 
to consider what implications the relationship between participation in workplace 
decision-making and broader political participation has as regards the possible effects of 
trade unions.  
The argument we have in mind can be traced back to John Stuart Mill and to a 
wider circle of industrial republicans and democrats in the Nineteenth century.37 It runs 
through the Guild Socialism of G. D. H. Cole to contemporary political theorists such as 
Carole Pateman and Joshua Cohen.38 In essence, the claim is that an authoritarian 
workplace will inhibit development of the dispositions and capacities necessary for, or 
supportive of, democratic citizenship and that, since effective democratic citizenship is 
highly desirable, workplaces should themselves be democratic: democracy in the 
workplace will have a positive ‘spillover effect’ on wider political democracy and is 
desirable for this reason. Cohen develops this as what he terms the ‘psychological 
support argument’ for workplace democracy: 
                                                
36 Torben Iversen and David Soskice, ‘Information, Inequality, and Mass Polarization: Ideology in 
Advanced Democracies’ (2015) 48 Comparative Political Studies 1781. 
37 John Stuart Mill, Principles of political economy, with some of their applications to social philosophy. 
Books IV & V; edited with an introduction by Donald Winch (first published 1848, Penguin 1970) ch 7; 
Alexander Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty 
in the Nineteemth Century (CUP 2015). 
38 GDH Cole, Guild Socialism Re-Stated (George, Allen and Unwin 1920); Carole Pateman, Participation 
and Democratic Theory (CUP 1970); Joshua Cohen, ‘The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy’ 
(1989) 6 Social Philosophy and Policy 25; see also Martin O’Neill, ‘Three Rawlsian Routes towards 
Economic Democracy’ (2008) 9 Revue de Philosophie Économique 29. 
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‘The psychological support argument holds that the extension of self-
government into the traditionally undemocratic sphere of work contributes to both the 
formation of an active character and to the development of a sense of the common good, 
and thus contributes to a more fully democratic state. Since capitalist property relations 
vest final authority in the owners of capital, they limit the extent of intra-firm 
democracy, thereby fostering passivity and a narrower base of political judgment. For 
these reasons, they are not well suited to a democratic society.’39  
 Although this tradition of argument typically aims at establishing grounds for 
workers’ control over productive enterprises, its relevance to our present discussion 
seems clear. A strong union presence in a workplace is not equivalent to workers’ 
control (indeed, it is importantly distinct from it). But nevertheless it can represent a 
significant form of what Nien-hê Hsieh terms ‘workplace republicanism’ as union 
power checks and limits the authority of the employer.40 In this way, one might expect 
unionisation to have many of the positive effects on democratic character claimed for 
workplace democracy.  
 In fact, when we turn to the empirical research in this area, one might argue that 
the case for unions in this respect is stronger than that for workplace democracy. On the 
one hand, research on the ‘spillover thesis’ from workplace democracy has tended to 
produce somewhat mixed results. Neil Carter’s review of the research suggests that the 
impact of workplace democracy on ‘political efficacy’ and political participation 
depends a to a great extent on the specific form of workplace democracy, how it was 
established, firm size, and on numerous other context-specific factors.41 On the other 
hand, the evidence on unions and political participation seems more straightforwardly 
consistent with the spillover thesis (see section 2.1 above). Daryl D’Art and Thomas 
Turner suggest that the observed union effect on participation may be caused partly in 
the way the psychological support argument suggests: ‘We argue that, in part, this 
[union-based] mobilization emerges from the fact that union membership, in providing 
employees with an independent voice, functions as a check on autocratic managerial 
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power and creates in employees the sense that they can exercise some control over their 
working lives’.42  
 In addition to contributing to democratic character in this way, it is possible of 
course that unions may also contribute through educative effects on members (or, 
indeed, indirectly, on non-members). For example, through campaigns and activities in 
the workplace, unions may be able to foster greater awareness of and sensitivity to 
issues of social inclusion and equality, which may have effects beyond the workplace. 
Consistent with this, one recent study finds that by exposing individuals to issues of just 
distribution within the workplace, unions affect attitudes towards justice and 
redistribution in the wider economy: egalitarian objectives in the first sphere support 
egalitarian attitudes in the second.43   
 
2.4 Unions and partisanship 
 Strong and vibrant political parties are a sine qua non for democratic politics in 
representative democracies. The widespread decline of party politics as measured by 
party membership and the often narrow electoral choice on offer is a major source of 
concern about Western democracy.44 But political parties do not come out of nowhere. 
They depend on a broader background of associations and alliances. Historically, trade 
unions have often had an essential role in providing organisational structure and various 
kinds of material support for parties of the left and, in some cases, also for the centre-
right.45 There is thus a natural line of argument that moves from a concern for the 
associational ecology of political parties to a concern with trade unions as a building 
block for creating stable and effective parties that represent the interests of working 
people and offer meaningful electoral choice.  
 Here the issue of the representativeness of so-called representative democracy is 
important. As parties of the left and centre-left have weakened their links to unions and 
sought stronger connection with voters and funders from social groups outside the 
working-class, they have consequently become less effective at representing the views 
and interests of some working people. This can create a representational deficit in the 
polity that manifests in a growth of distrust and alienation, not just in relation to specific 
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parties but towards the political system.46 This is, in essence, the flip-side of a point 
suggested above (section 2.1), that unions can use their influence within parties to shape 
party platforms in ways that draw the interest and support of working-class voters.47 
 
2.5 Unions and elite recruitment 
 This brings us to a further point: when trade unions have strong connections into 
the party system they can provide an important means of recruiting individuals into the 
‘political elite’. The difference in the class composition of Conservative and Labour UK 
Cabinets up to 1955 is striking: while only 3% of Conservative Cabinet members had 
working-class parents, 55% of Labour Cabinet members did.48 The working-class 
character of Labour Cabinets in part reflected the role of unions in recruiting Labour 
MPs.  
The union-party nexus thus helped to make the political elite more inclusive in 
class terms. This constituted a gain for some in terms of equality of opportunity at the 
individual level. It also constituted a likely gain in terms of the quality of deliberation 
and decision-making within the legislature and political executive insofar as these were 
consequently exposed to a wider range of life experiences and perspectives.49 As 
suggested above, it also contributed to making the political system more representative 
in terms of social interests.  
The picture has changed a great deal in recent years. There has been a 
substantial decline in the proportion of Labour MPs from working-class occupations; a 
substantial decline in the extent to which voters identify Labour with the ‘working-
class’; and there is evidence that Labour is no longer seen predominantly as a working-
class party in part because its MPs are less working-class than in the past.50 The 
weakening of the link between unions and party likely has contributed to this dynamic: 
while ‘around 10 per cent of Labour MPs were previously union officials from the 
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1950s to the 1980s, by 2015 only 1 per cent of Labour MPs had worked for a trade 
union’.51 
 
2.6 Unions and political voice 
In addition to influencing policy through their connection to political parties, 
unions can of course directly intervene in political debates and decision-making to 
advance the interests of working people, counter-balancing the influence of business 
and the very rich. At one level, this is a matter of giving voice to ideas and interests so 
as to shape the ‘national conversation’ about policy. The interests of capital are quick to 
organise to project their voice strongly within national debates. Without a 
countervailing voice, it is unlikely that workers’ interests will get fair consideration 
within the broader public political culture; and without strong unions such 
countervailing voices will simply not be sufficiently heard. Extending this point, unions 
can also obviously play a similarly countervailing role in terms of lobbying and direct 
campaigning. In her discussion of community unionism in the USA, Fine describes how 
unions working in cooperation with community-based organizations use direct action 
campaigns to put pressure on mainstream politicians to adjust their policy platforms in 
ways that align with workers’ needs and win their political engagement.52 More 
generally, trade unions can contribute significantly to community organizing, joining 
with other civil society groups such as faith groups to construct powerful local alliances 
to shape public policy.53 In the UK, for example, union branches have been active in 
Citizens UK, an alliance of groups that has successfully put the Living Wage on the 
national agenda (Jamoul and Wills 2008).54 
Consistent with the claim that unions make a difference to the ‘national 
conversation’, there is considerable cross-national evidence that higher levels of 
unionisation and stronger collective labour rights are associated with different policies 
and outcomes: lower earnings inequality, lower income inequality, more redistribution, 
and a more expansive, ‘decommodifying’ welfare state.55 
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2.7 Unions and international cooperation 
 Two further potential democratising contributions of trade unions can be briefly 
noted. The first concerns the potential for trade unions to act as organizations to help 
promote coordinated transnational action on issues that affect workers. One way in 
which capital can try to evade the demands of democracy, of course, is by exiting a 
given nation-state or threatening to do so. Unless nation-states move back to a world of 
stringent controls on capital export, the obvious counter to this is for democracy to be 
scaled-up to the transnational level. Insofar as trade unions have international links they 
have some potential to act in coordinated ways at the transnational level and so may 
help in the project of building the social and institutional bases for democracy at this 
level. Concretely, this might involve coordinated direct action against particular firms, 
or transnational political campaigns addressed to transnational political bodies (e.g., the 
European Commission and Parliament), or seeking union representation within major 
international bodies such as the IMF or WTO.56  
 
2.8 Unions and control over investment 
 Unions may also have a role in democratising control of investment. Investment 
decisions obviously affect societies in profound and pervasive ways. Nevertheless, in a 
capitalist society, they remain largely at the discretion of capital-owners. Insofar as 
unions have a role in managing investment funds, however, then this might serve 
somewhat to democratise investment decisions. In some advanced capitalist countries in 
the 1970s, strong union movements devised ambitious plans with radical implications in 
this regard. The famous example is the ‘Meidner Plan’ in Sweden that would have 
required companies to issue new shares each year into union-controlled collective 
investment funds.57 But aside from these radical possibilities, unions are able to 
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establish and exert some control over investment, e.g., through a role in managing 
pension funds. In the US, ‘financial activism’ has become an important plank of union 
strategy since the 1980s with unions intervening, as shareholders, to reform companies’ 
structures of governance.58 
 
2.9 But aren’t unions bad for democracy? 
 Our argument thus far has stressed the benefits of strong trade unions for 
democracy. Unions are, however, often viewed and presented as bad for democracy. In 
Britain in the 1970s, unions were frequently said in the press to be ‘holding the country 
to ransom’ and the February 1974 general election was fought by the Conservatives on 
the platform of ‘Who governs?’, the implication being that voters had to choose 
between parliamentary democracy and rule by union overlords. In response to this vein 
of scepticism, we make three points.  
First, while individual unions can obviously use their power in unfair or 
imprudent ways, we think it vital to be explicit about the underlying reality of class 
politics.59 In a capitalist economy, capital almost always has the option of exit in some 
form and this puts strong and constant pressure on governments to shape policy to 
accord with the broad interests of capital-owners. It is much harder for labour to bring 
similar pressure to bear because of the organisation and coordination involved.60 Insofar 
as unions manage to bring pressure to bear on governments, this is, broadly speaking, a 
democratising influence in society as it tends to counter-balance the background 
pressures on policy from capital. Governments – and electorates – have to find ways to 
accommodate both sets of interests rather than passively accommodating to an implicit 
but powerful norm that is more straightforwardly pro-capital. If we picture capitalist 
democracy as a kind of ‘mixed constitution’ in Aristotle’s terms, combining institutions 
that empower the rich (such as private control over investment) and those that empower 
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the poor and non-wealthy, union power shifts the mixed constitution in a less oligarchic 
direction.  
 Second, we think it important to attend to the structure and spread of trade 
unionism. There is a strong body of evidence that where unions are encompassing in 
coverage of the workforce and centralised or otherwise capable of coordinated action, 
they facilitate effective management of the economy.61 Rather than being a threat to 
governance, the unions facilitate and participate in it. As indicated above (section 2.6), 
this is typically a democratising influence in that it shifts the terms of the national 
political conversation towards closer consideration of workers’ interests. We should 
recall the cross-national evidence, noted in section 2.6, on the difference unions make to 
such things as earnings and income inequality.  
 The third part of our response is to stress the importance of internal union 
democracy and unions’ inclusiveness. If unions have power but operate in ways that are 
not robustly democratic, or fail to practice inclusion in their membership and methods 
of work, then we would agree that there is cause for concern. This is why we think the 
state has a legitimate role in legislating some basic requirements for union 
organization.62 We return to this point briefly below in elaborating what we call the 
promotive stance of the state towards trade unionism.  
 
3. The promotive stance 
We have argued that trade unions can and do serve as a counter-weight to 
oligarchy in numerous ways and, in these respects, contribute to substantive political 
equality. If we are right, then this is a reason to think that a democratic state ought to 
adopt a promotive stance towards trade unionism.63 In short, if strong unions are a 
feature of a robust democracy; and if a democratic state should take action to sustain the 
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conditions for its own health as a democracy; then surely the state should be supportive 
of trade unionism.64 But what do we mean by a ‘promotive stance’? What can be said 
against it? 
 
3.1 Defining the promotive stance 
In principle, states can adopt legal and policy frameworks that discourage trade 
unionism, encourage it, or aim at neutrality.  
If the state bans independent trade unions, it obviously has adopted a 
discouraging stance. Some might argue that the absence of a ban suffices for a neutral 
stance. However, the common law baseline of countries such as the UK itself creates an 
inhospitable environment for trade unions. Cole puts the point as follows: ‘According to 
the common law, a Trade Union, if it is not in itself illegal, at least comes into conflict 
with the law as soon as it takes any action for the regulation of the conditions of 
employment of its members’.65 On efforts by workers to achieve union recognition in 
particular, Alan Bogg points out that: ‘‘Neutral’ enforcement of property rights mean 
that unions can be excluded from the employer’s property, while the employer can 
campaign to a ‘captive audience’ workforce at any time during the working day. 
‘Neutral’ enforcement of freedom of contract means that workers can be dismissed with 
impunity for choosing to support the union’.66 The neutrality embodied in the common 
law background is not sufficiently attuned to the inequalities in power between workers 
and employers that this legal background itself creates. A plausible conception of the 
neutral stance needs to take these background inequalities into account.67 
A more plausible candidate in this respect, as discussed by Bogg, is the model of 
statutory union recognition established in the UK in 1999, which has much in common 
with the US’s system deriving from the Wagner Act of 1935. In this kind of model – 
we’ll call it the Wagner-type model - the default is a non-unionised workplace. But 
under certain conditions, workers can trigger a workplace ballot on union recognition. If 
there is a majority in the ballot, the union wins recognition and the employer then has 
duties to respect the union as a collective bargaining agent. There are rules also to 
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ensure that unions and employers both get a ‘fair hearing’ in the run-up to the ballot 
(e.g., workers cannot be dismissed for supporting unionisation). In practice, neither the 
US nor the UK actually live up to the ‘even-handed’ promise of this model. In the UK, 
there are a number of concerns such as the lack of guaranteed union access to 
workplaces before a ballot is triggered, and about the requirement that majority votes 
meet a threshold of at least 40% of the workers eligible to vote, both rules that weight 
things further in favour of the non-union default.68 However, it is possible in principle 
to correct these features and to imagine a variant of the model that would give unions 
more access and individual workers more protection. Arguably, a suitably amended 
variant of the model would exemplify a neutral stance on the part of the state towards 
trade unionism. 
 In contrast to this neutral stance, Keith Ewing advocates a state that will: 
‘…intervene to ensure that the institutional structures are in place to facilitate 
trade-union involvement in the decision-making process, using the law or other forms of 
state apparatus in a positive sense where necessary, rather than merely to remove 
impediments to trade-union organization, as in the case of the liberal state.’69 
As we will explain below, we see no inconsistency between such intervention 
and the ‘liberal state’, but otherwise Ewing’s formulation captures in general terms what 
we mean by a promotive stance. Concretely, this stance will guide the state’s approach 
to a range of key questions concerning union membership rules, union recognition, 
duties on employers to engage in collective bargaining, and the rights of workers to take 
strike action. Roughly speaking, the idea is to switch the default setting to union 
membership and recognition; to complement this with clear duties on employers to 
bargain with unions in good faith; and to secure for workers an expansive right to strike, 
e.g., one that includes the right to take secondary action.70 Ewing points out that the UK 
state did in fact adopt a promotive stance for much of the twentieth century, e.g., by 
authorising executive agencies to encourage collective bargaining at industry level. He 
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and John Hendy have set out an ambitious proposal for a revival of this approach.71 
Under Ewing and Hendy’s proposal, government enumerates the various sectors of the 
economy and then legislates the establishment of a Sectoral Employment Commission 
in each sector. SECs are to have equal employer and union representation. They would 
have the power to make authoritative rules within the sector with regard to a wide range 
of employment issues such as pay, health and safety rules, holidays, disciplinary rules 
and trade union membership.72 In this model, the state takes the view that unions are a 
desirable part of a system of economic governance and deliberately creates this system 
and brings unions into it.  
We repeat, however, that the promotive stance as we conceive it can also imply 
duties on trade unions, as well as justifying state intervention in support of the 
fulfillment of those duties. In particular, as suggested above (section 2.8), we think there 
is a legitimate role for the state in upholding good democratic and inclusive practices 
within trade unions (such as requiring the use of the secret ballot in votes over strike 
action).73 We also emphasise that the promotive stance has a qualitative as well as 
quantitative aspect: what matters is not just the raw proportion of the workforce in 
unions, or covered by collective bargaining agreements, but the distribution of union 
support and representation within the workforce, in particular the inclusion and 
participation of more disadvantaged workers.74   
 
3.2 Defending the promotive stance 
 If this describes what the promotive stance is, in broad terms, is it desirable? 
Even if there are grounds for such a stance, are there not also strong, and perhaps 
stronger, considerations against it? There are a number of criticisms and concerns we 
might discuss here but we will focus on two, both of which claim that the promotive 
stance is objectionably illiberal. If the objections hold then it looks as if liberal 
democracies may have to forego pro-union interventions that are putatively good for 
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their democratic character, on the grounds that these are also bad for their liberal 
character. 
 The first objection appeals to the value of neutrality. One strand in contemporary 
liberal philosophy argues that the state should not take sides on questions about the 
nature of the good life, or between ‘comprehensive doctrines’ of a philosophical or 
religious nature, that are reasonably disputed by citizens. Neutrality here expresses the 
idea that the state should affirm the equal dignity of all citizens and fails to do so if it 
takes sides in such disputes. Neutrality at this level might be thought, in turn, to demand 
neutrality in relation to associations: it is wrong for the state to promote a specific 
religious group or give special status to associations such as the Boy Scouts or the Girl 
Guides.75 
As one of us has explained in earlier work, the objection fails in general terms.76 
The principle of state neutrality advanced within contemporary liberal political 
philosophy, in particular in the work of John Rawls, is one that constrains the kind of 
justification that citizens may offer for their laws, particularly (for Rawls) in relation to 
‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘matters of basic justice’.77 Justification must be based on 
‘public reason’ rather than on considerations internal to a specific comprehensive 
ethical doctrine. Public reason includes, centrally, considerations of social justice, 
considerations that are, as Rawls would argue, acceptable to reasonable citizens of 
diverse comprehensive views. In Rawls’s view, principles of justice include a 
commitment to what he terms the ‘fair value of the political liberties’, a commitment to 
ensure that the value of political liberties (such as rights to vote and stand for office) is 
not undermined by such things as background economic inequality.78 Our democratic 
case for trade unions, and for a promotive stance based in part on unions’ contribution 
to democracy, can be seen precisely as appealing to the fair value of political liberties. It 
is, therefore, grounded in public reason and so is fundamentally neutral in the 
appropriate liberal sense. 
A second objection focuses on specifics of the promotive stance, in particular on 
what it might imply for union membership rules. On one interpretation, the promotive 
stance entails support for the ‘closed shop’: an arrangement under which union 
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membership is a condition of employment. But this violates the idea that, in a liberal 
society, associational membership should be voluntary. In response, we make two 
points. First, even were one to concede the objection to the point of giving up altogether 
on the closed shop, this would not necessarily rule out other interventions that we have 
sketched as part of the promotive stance. Second, and more fundamentally, we think the 
legitimate liberal concern here can and – for reasons internal to liberalism itself – should 
be met without giving up altogether on the closed shop. The debate around the 
justifiability of the closed shop is often presented in terms of a claim of individual 
liberty against a claim of fairness between workers in a given workplace or industry. 
The fairness issue is said to concern the risk of ‘free-riding’ by non-union members: 
they get the benefits of higher wages or better conditions negotiated by the union 
without carrying any of the associated costs. Our argument in this chapter suggests, 
however, that more is at stake here. If trade unions make an important contribution to 
social justice more widely, including to maintaining the fair value of political liberties, 
then non-union members are also free-riding to some degree in relation to these goods. 
Or, to put the point in another way, these workers’ lack of membership and participation 
in unions creates a kind of ‘negative externality’ for the wider promotion of social 
justice and (our focus in this chapter) a robust democracy. In view of this it is 
reasonable – reasonable in terms of the pursuit of a liberal conception of social justice – 
to make union membership the default. Where the individual has a genuine 
conscientious objection to unions we agree that this should be respected. The default is 
trumped. But in order to protect the default, and the liberal, social justice values it 
protects, the state may legitimately take steps to prevent the abuse of the right of 
conscientious exemption. One proposal is to require the objector to make payments to a 
charity of their choice equal to the cost of union dues.79 Related issues internal to 
membership, such as liability to political party and campaign contributions, can be 
approached in a similar spirit. There is an important value here concerning individual 
consent and the right to refuse association. But it is a mistake, and not necessarily in 
best accord with a liberal account of justice in an all-things-considered sense, to think 
that this value requires union membership and recognition rules akin to what we have 
called the merely neutral stance (i.e., following, with appropriate amendments, the 
Wagner-type model). 
                                                





Concerns that liberal democracies in advanced capitalist economies have 
recently experienced an oligarchic shift have given urgency to both activist and 
academic efforts to identify ways of renewing democracy. However, many proposals 
neglect the associational environment in which democratic institutions work. This 
carries the risk of misdiagnosing the problems with existing institutions and/or of 
overestimating the likely counter-oligarchical effects of particular reforms to decision-
making structures. In this chapter we have sought to reaffirm the perspective of 
‘associative democracy’ 80 in particular exploring the potential contribution of trade 
unions to political equality.  
We hope that we have convincingly made the case that, given the ways in which 
the political power of the rich has come to undermine political equality and the fair 
value of the political liberties, there are decisive reasons for the state to support and 
promote trade unions in their role as sources of countervailing political power, 
redressing underlying inequalities of voice and influence, and acting as a bulwark 
against oligarchic power. A neutral concern for the political standing of all citizens 
should not lead a liberal state towards neutrality about institutions such as trade unions. 
Rather it is precisely because of the state’s equal concern for the political standing of all 
citizens that it has a duty to ensure the associational preconditions for that equal 
political standing, and therefore why the liberal state has reason to promote the 
flourishing of trade unions, as the best chance we have of finding an associational 
counterweight to the inegalitarian power of the wealthy. 
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